Liberalizing climate-friendly goods and technologies in WTO environmental goods negotiations: product coverage, modalities, challenges and the way forward by Zhang, ZhongXiang
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Liberalizing climate-friendly goods and
technologies in WTO environmental
goods negotiations: product coverage,
modalities, challenges and the way
forward
ZhongXiang Zhang
East-West Center
1. April 2009
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/16943/
MPRA Paper No. 16943, posted 26. August 2009 00:19 UTC
The previous version: April 1, 2009 
This version: August 10, 2009 
 
 
Liberalizing Climate-Friendly Goods and Technologies in WTO Environmental 
Goods Negotiations: Product Coverage, Modalities, Challenges and the Way 
Forward1 
 
 
ZhongXiang Zhang, Ph.D in Economics  
张中祥  美国东西方中心研究部资深研究员、经济学博士 
Senior Fellow 
Research Program 
East-West Center 
1601 East-West Road 
Honolulu, HI 96848-1601 
United States 
Tel:  +1-808-944 7265  
Fax: +1-808-944 7298 
Email: ZhangZ@EastWestCenter.org 
 
 
Abstract 
The Doha Round Agenda (paragraph 31(3)) mandates to liberalize environmental goods 
and services. This mandate offers a good opportunity to put climate-friendly goods and 
services on a fast track to liberalization. Agreement on this paragraph should represent 
one immediate contribution that the WTO can make to fight against climate change. This 
paper presents the key issues surrounding liberalized trade in climate-friendly goods and 
technologies in WTO environmental goods negotiations. It begins with what products to 
liberalize and in which manner. Clearly, WTO environmental goods negotiations to date 
show that WTO member countries are divided by this key issue. Focusing on the issue, 
the paper explores options available to liberalize trade in climate-friendly goods and 
technologies, both within and outside the WTO, and along with these discussion, 
discusses how to serve the best interests of developing countries. 
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1 Prepared for Trade and Environment Review 2009, a flagship publication of the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). It has benefited from 
helpful comments from Ulrich Hoffmann and Darlan F. Martí. That said, the views 
expressed here are those of the author, and do not reflect the positions of his affiliations 
and the UNCTAD. The author bears sole responsibility for any errors and omissions that 
may remain. 
1. Introduction 
The Doha Round Agenda (paragraph 31(3)) mandates to negotiate “the reduction or, as 
appropriate, elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to environmental goods and 
services (EGS).” This mandate offers a good opportunity to put climate-friendly goods 
and services on a fast track to liberalization. Agreement on this paragraph should 
represent one immediate contribution that the WTO can make to fight against climate 
change (Lamy, 2008).  
 
Climate-friendly technologies (or goods) refer to those the production of which or the 
utilization of which reduce climate risks to a greater extent than alternative technologies 
for producing the same product (or alternative products that serve the same purpose). 
Among climate-friendly technologies are those aimed at improving energy efficiency or 
increasing energy generation from new and renewable sources and goods. Liberalizing 
such climate-friendly technologies, goods and services contributes to not only increasing 
the choices available for importing countries, but also lowering the costs of these choices 
for the countries to either comply with existing and future greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emission commitments or to limit the growth of GHG emissions. This market expansion 
as a result of trade liberalization will put a downward pressure on prices in home country 
markets and increase competition between imported and domestic goods, thus further 
lowering the compliance costs. By increasing the dissemination of climate-friendly goods 
and technologies at a lower cost, trade liberalization will make it less difficult to set 
stringent GHG emission targets beyond 2012, given that the world’s GHG emissions 
should be cut at least in half by 2050 that the IPCC argues necessary in order to avoid 
dangerous climate change consequences.   
 
This paper will focus on environmental goods (EGs), as that is the area in which 
negotiations within WTO have to date been more active. This by no means undermines 
the importance of environmental services in preserving the environment and mitigating 
climate change. Arguably, many services directly address climate change mitigation. 
 
 
2. What Products to Liberalize and in Which Manner? 
 
2.1. Negative Approach versus Positive Approach 
To indentify which goods and services to ban or promote, a basic distinction can be 
drawn between negative and positive approaches. A negative approach would be to 
identify specific goods and services with which countries are required to ban trading. 
Clearly, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (MP), which 
was signed in 1987 and has since been amended and strengthened in a number of aspects, 
has taken this approach. The MP uses trade measures as one enforcement mechanism 
among several policy instruments in achieving its aim of protecting the ozone layer. 
Parties to the treaty are required to ban trading with non-parties in ozone-depleting 
substances (ODS), such as CFCs, in products containing them, such as refrigerators, and 
potentially, in products made with but not containing CFCs, such as electronic 
components. The last provision has not yet been implemented primarily because of 
problems of detection, and also because of the small volumes of CFCs involved. These 
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trade measures have been gradually extended to all the categories of ozone-depleting 
substances covered by the MP (Brack, 1996; Zhang, 1998). Accompanied with finance 
and technology transfer mechanisms, this approach works effectively under the MP in 
phasing out the ODS and putting the ozone layer on a path to recovery (2009a).  
 
The products to be banned under the MP are clear. However, the identification of 
products to be banned is less straightforward with relation to carbon abatement and 
climate change mitigation. Every product or technology causes environmental harm or 
contributes climate effect to some degree. A climate-friendly product or technology is 
just a concept of relative environmental performance. Such a product or technology tends 
to be sector- and country-specific, and is subject to change over time. For example, 
natural gas is less carbon-polluting than coal. Shifting to natural gas has been indentified 
as part of the solutions to climate change mitigation. This has been the main reason for 
Qatar in its submission to WTO to propose liberalizing natural gas and natural gas-related 
technologies as a way to reduce GHG emissions. But natural gas is more carbon-polluting 
than wind power that emits zero carbon emissions when operating. A coal-fired power is 
more carbon-polluting than a natural gas-fired one, but if coupled with carbon capture 
and storage (CCS) technology, it will be more climate-friendly than a natural gas-fired 
power without CCS. Besides, a country’s choice of fuels and technologies depends to a 
large extent on its resource endowments and the relative prices. The fact that countries 
like China and India use more coal is not because they like coal, rather because of their 
abundance in coal and the relative price difference between coal and its more 
environmentally-friendly substitutes. So, while some countries or regional agreements 
(e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement) may have a negative list on services or 
investment in certain technologies which are restricted, it is most unlikely for countries 
will broadly agree on a list of goods that need to be banned. Moreover, arguably, for the 
service of climate change mitigation objective, if there were a ban or restriction, that 
would be on high GHG-emitting goods. This will face resistance from countries that 
object to the use of trade restrictions based on processes and production methods (PPMs), 
partly because it is difficult for customs officials at the border to distinguish high GHG-
emitting products with low GHG-emitting counterparts. There also exists uncertainty 
about WTO compatibility regarding a distinction on a product based on a way that 
product is produced, rather than on the characteristics of the final product as well as a 
controversy over whether WTO jurisprudence has moved beyond the PPM concept 
(Zhang, 2004; Zhang and Assunção, 2004; Howse and Van Bork, 2006). Thus, a negative 
approach will not work in a post-2012 climate regime. 
 
By contrast, a positive approach seeks to indentify certain goods and services to ensure 
their enhanced market access. A positive approach holds the promise. Establishing a list 
of goods, technologies and services that are encouraged encounters the problems on their 
own, but is easier than having a common list of goods, technologies and services that 
need to be banned. 
 
2.2. List, Project, Integrated and Request-Offer Approaches 
The question then is which EGS need to be encouraged. Identifying such EGS depends 
on the definition of EGS. Given the conceptual complexities in and a lack of consensus 
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on the definition of EGS, WTO members have persistently disagreed over how to identify 
which EGS should be subject to trade liberalization. Three approaches have been 
proposed in the WTO negotiations. The OECD has advocated a list-based approach, 
whereby goods and services on an agreed list will be subject to enhanced market access 
through the elimination or reduction of bound tariffs (and non-tariff barriers (NTBs)) 
permanently and on a most favored nation (MFN) basis. Such lists have been produced 
by the OECD and APEC. The two lists have 54 goods in common at the HS (Harmonized 
Commodity Description and Coding System) 6-digit level. However, 50 goods on the 
APEC list do not appear on the OECD list, while 68 goods on the OECD list do not 
appear on the APEC list. The main difference between the two lists is that minerals and 
chemicals for water/waste treatment are exclusive to the OECD list, while the APEC list 
includes a relatively more extensive set of goods needed for environmental monitoring 
and assessment. The OECD list also contains a large number of environmentally 
preferable products (Steenblik, 2005). Taking the OECD or APEC lists of EGs as 
reference points, the so-called “Friends of Environmental Goods” group of countries, 
comprising Canada, the EU, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, Chinese 
Taipei and the U.S., proposed in April 2007 a list of 153 products. Just prior to the UN 
climate change conference in Bali, the EU and U.S. submitted a joint proposal at the 
WTO calling for trade liberalization of 43 climate-friendly goods that were identified by 
the World Bank (2007) from a list of the Friends’ 153 products, with an aim to have a 
zero tariff for these climate-friendly goods by 2013. 
 
Many developing countries have consistently expressed concerns about using a list of 
environmental goods slated for expedited liberalization, noting that many products on 
that list are primarily of export interest to industrialized countries, thus compromising its 
development dimension.2 The Indian Ambassador was quoted as even saying that this 
EU-U.S. proposal was “a disguised effort at getting market access through other means 
and does not satisfy the mandate for environment.” (ICTSD, 2007a). Another sticking 
point is related to the issue of dual use, in that many product categories proposed on an 
EGs list include, at the HS 6-digit level, other products that also have non-environmental 
uses as well as environmental uses. In response, India has advocated a project-based 
approach, whereby each WTO member would designate a national authority to select 
environmental projects based upon criteria developed by the Special Session of the 
Committee on Trade and Environment and whose domestic implementation would be 
subject to the WTO Dispute Settlement. The EGS required for a particular selected 
environmental project would temporarily have preferred market access for the duration of 
the project. India argued that the project approach would ensure that the approved EGS 
are used for environmental purposes. Argentina proposed an integrated approach. It aims 
to bridge the gap between the list approach and project approach, resembling the project 
approach but with multilaterally pre-identified categories of goods used in the approved 
                                                 
2 U.S. Trade Representative rejected complaints that the EU-U.S. list consisted only of 
products of export interest to industrialized countries, pointing out that the U.S. was in 
fact a net importer of the 43 products in 2006, with US$18 billion in imports surpassing 
exports by US$3 billion and Mexico and China as the two top sources for those products 
(ICTSD, 2007c). 
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projects. Brazil suggested a request-offer approach, whereby countries would request 
specific liberalization commitments from each other on products of interest to them and 
then extend tariff cuts they deemed appropriate equally to all WTO members on a MFN 
basis. Brazil argued that its approach followed in previous GATT/WTO negotiations and 
took into account developing country interests more adequately than the common list that 
was put forward by the EU-U.S. submission (ICTSD, 2007a,b). An analysis of the 
Friends’ 153 EGs list by Jha (2008) indicates that a handful of developing countries are 
among the top 10 importers and exporters in various categories of EGs relevant to climate 
change mitigation. Based on the findings, she suggests that these countries could usefully 
engage in a request-offer approach to ensure trade wins. In this way, while the benefits of 
trade liberalization may be multilateralized, the cost would be borne only by a few 
players. These would be the very players that have a lot more to gain through 
liberalization.  
 
All these different voices clearly suggest that some WTO members have yet to be 
convinced of the climate mitigation credentials of some of the products that Europe and 
the U.S. have put on the table. Moreover, the advance of technology will inevitably 
eclipse the continuing merits of some existing products. Thus, an exclusive focus on the 
liberalization of these existing products raises the risk of being locked in existing patterns 
in international trade in technologically advanced climate change products (i.e., 
producers of technology and importers of that technology). Furthermore, the developing 
world is in search of both an economic and an environmental gain through these 
negotiations under the Doha Development Round — and rightly so (Lamy, 2008). Even 
if these negotiations are on environmental issues, they must nevertheless deliver a trade 
gain if they are being conducted under the Development Round roof of the WTO.  
 
 
3. The Way Forward 
While there are significant export opportunities for developing countries in a large 
number of low-tech EGs in the core list of environmentally preferable products defined 
by UNCTAD (2005), which also happen to be the dual-use products (Hamwey, 2005), 
most developing countries are hesitant to liberalize bound tariffs on dual-use products, 
due to concerns about the adverse impact of such broader liberalization on their 
established domestic industries and jobs and, in some cases, on their tariff revenues 
(ICTSD, 2008; World Bank, 2007). They insist in applying single end-use parameter in 
screening EGs, and only those indentified EGs based on this parameter would then be 
taken up for tariff reduction negotiations (Howse and Van Bork, 2006). Isolating those 
products of single environmental use requires to assign clearer HS code or product 
descriptions for environmental goods. The HS allows countries to track trade volumes 
and tariff levels. The more digits are included in a code, the more specific the description 
of the good is. Currently, HS numbers for products are only harmonized cross WTO 
members up to the six-digit level. However, many HS product categories at the six digit 
level contain products that have both non-environmental uses and environmental uses. 
Clearly identifying goods of single environmental use needs to go beyond the six digit 
level. However, no uniform code exists beyond this level. So, as product descriptions get 
more specific, different WTO members use different codes and descriptions. To identify 
 5
and liberalize specific goods of single environmental use, including those climate 
mitigation goods, WTO members need to harmonize at least the ex-out product 
descriptions cross countries. However, harmonizing HS codes themselves beyond the six 
digit level will be time-consuming and would not be viable, given the short time horizon 
for a possible conclusion of the Doha Round and the timing of review cycles of the 
World Customs Organization, which considers HS amendments once every five years, 
with the latest amendment in June 2004 and entered into force on January 1, 2007 (see 
Vikhlyaev (2009) for further discussion on dual-use and the limitations of the HS 
nomenclature). 
 
What are then other options that need to be explored to accelerate liberalization of EGS? 
Arguably, countries are likely to agree upon a narrow choice of climate-friendly products 
that would be acceptable to a broader range of countries rather than a broader range of 
products that would be acceptable to only a few countries. One way forward along this 
line is to initially focus on specific sectors in which the interests of both developed and 
developing countries coincide in fostering trade liberalization. Increasing energy 
efficiency is widely considered as the most effective and lowest cost means of cutting 
GHG emissions, and trade in renewable energy products in developing countries appears 
sensitive to reduction in tariffs (Jha, 2008) and industrialized countries are set to take on 
higher proportions of renewable energies in their energy mix either for complying with 
their GHG emission targets or aimed at cutting their dependence on foreign oil or both. 
Thus, the initial round of liberalization should include renewable energy products and 
energy-efficient technologies. The World Bank (2007) estimates that a removal of tariffs 
for four basic clean energy technologies (clean coal, efficient lighting, solar and wind) in 
18 developing countries of high GHG emissions would result in a trade gain of up to 7%. 
The trade gain could be boosted by as much as 13% if the non-tariff barriers could also 
be removed. These gains were calculated based on a static trade analysis, and were well 
underestimated because they didn’t take into account the dynamics of these EGs, i.e., 
trends in the growth of their export levels and the size of their world export market. 
Added to the trade gains is that using these more climate-friendly technologies and 
products to replace those more GHG-polluting alternatives will translate into a significant 
reduction in GHG emissions. Clearly, liberalizing trade in low-carbon goods and 
technologies serves both trade and climate mitigation interests.   
 
Another area of accelerated liberalization is products, technologies and services used for 
small-scale CDM (clean development mechanism) projects (e.g., micro-hydro projects, 
efficient cooking, and efficient lighting) and programmatic CDM.3 The CDM has, in 
part, been successful (Zhang, 2008). The global number of CDM projects registered and 
in the pipeline totals 4588 (UNEP Risoe Center, 2009) - well above what was envisione
by countries when they negotiated, designed and launched this mechanism. However, th
lion’s share of these CDM projects has gone to a handful of major developing countries 
d 
e 
                                                 
3 Van der Gaast and Begg (2009) argue that programmatic CDM is very suitable for 
energy efficiency improvement projects in households (e.g., cooking, lighting) and 
industry (e.g., one technology applied within an industrial sector at different locations but 
under similar circumstances). 
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like China and India, and many countries, Sub-Saharan Africa in particular, have been 
left out. One of the main reasons is that the transaction costs associated with the CDM 
project cycle have seriously hampered small-scale CDM projects in these countries. 
Although registration fees are set considerably lower for small-scale CDM projects and 
simplified methodologies and procedures are also set for those projects, many other 
transaction costs are independent of project size and will thus have a bigger relative 
impact on small-scale CDM projects. Programmatic CDM bundles together small-scale 
CDM projects or a programme of activities makes a better contribution to sustainable 
development and communality empowerment than a single CDM project, but entails high 
transaction costs. So, liberalizing products, technologies and services in this area could 
reduce equipment costs and contribute to lowering transaction costs for potential 
investors, thus facilitating to capitalize on untapped potential of programmatic CDM and 
extend the mechanism’s reach of both project type and geographical region.4  
 
Even for the two areas, they still need to respond to developing country concerns about 
the impacts that liberalization has on their domestic industries before a deal is eventually 
hammered out. This particularly applies to environmental goods and technologies that 
developing countries are not competitive in producing. Fox example, aimed at 
encouraging domestic production and jobs, India has imposed very high tariffs on and 
China has put in place a local content requirement for wind turbines (Alavi, 2007; Zhang, 
2008). These policies act as barriers to foreign suppliers of wind turbines, and are seen 
beneficial for local wind turbine makers. Indeed, the three largest local turbine makers, 
namely, Sinovel Wind, Goldwind Science and Technology, and Dongfang Electric, 
contribute an increasing share of total new installations in China. Together they now 
account for over 50% of a market once dominated by foreign firms until 2008. However, 
such policies hurt home countries in financial terms. While being less costly, domestic 
wind turbines in China break down more often and have overall capacity factors of 
several percentage points lower than foreign models. Such a few percentage points 
difference might not seem significant, but could well make a difference between a wind 
farm that is economically viable and one that is not (Zhang, 2009b). Such a local content 
requirement may be considered necessary when a domestic market was dominated by 
foreign firms. Now local turbine makes already dominate the market, and it becomes 
increasingly questionable to still practice such a policy. However, there is no sign that 
China is going to dismantle this protection. This clearly exemplifies challenges ahead and 
uncertainty about whether there is a deal on a desired level of trade liberalization. No 
need to say, having an agreement on EGS or a subset of EGS such as climate-friendly 
goods under WTO is the first best choice. However, should WTO members fail to reach 
such an agreement, then alternative options, ideally still under the Doha Round, need to 
                                                 
4 Here I advocate that priority is given to products, technologies and services used for 
small-scale CDM projects and programmatic CDM in liberalizing EGS. Put simply, they 
should be included in any list of EGS for accelerated liberalization. While being 
motivated for facilitating small-scale CDM projects and programmatic CDM, any agreed 
tariff reduction or elimination would apply to all these EGS, irrespective of whether these 
EGS are used for CDM projects. This makes it conceptually different from the Indian 
project proposal that ties the liberalization of any EGS to specific projects. 
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be explored, although business groups have even voiced to remove EGs talks from 
Doha.5   
 
An agreement similar to the Information Technology Agreement (ITA) is one option to 
go, whereby a certain number of members representing a minimum percentage of trade in 
climate-friendly goods and services would need to join6 in order for it to come into effect 
(World Bank, 2007). Such an agreement will be open to voluntary participation, and once 
it came into effect, the benefits of trade liberalization in climate-friendly goods and 
technologies would extend to all WTO members on a MFN basis. The ITA has 
incorporated a mechanism for a review of product coverage every three years. This may 
have tempered the disappointment among many countries with the initial exclusion of 
certain products. Given that developing countries are currently not significant suppliers of 
climate-friendly goods and technologies, priority should be given to additional products 
being submitted by developing countries for inclusion in the future review. However, the 
downside of this ITA’s mechanism is that no new products have ever been added since 
1997. So, developing countries may be suspicious of this trap, and feel reluctant to join. 
  
Another option is a plurilateral agreement in this area, similar to the WTO Agreement on 
Government Procurement. WTO members could opt to join or to stay outside of, but the 
benefits of trade liberalization would extend only to participating members on a MFN 
basis, not to non-signatory WTO members as the aforementioned an-ITA type agreement 
does. While such a plurilateral agreement is not ideal, it would still have value, in 
particular if the key trading parties were involved. Such an agreement could eventually be 
made multilateral once a certain number of members representing a minimum percentage 
of trade in climate-friendly goods and services would join 
 
Other options for this sort of agreement may be within the context of regional or bilateral 
trade agreements (RTAs). Such agreements aim to liberalize substantially goods at the 
HS six-digit level. As a result, product classification and the dual-use problems 
associated with WTO negotiations on EGS may be less of a concern. These agreements 
surely liberalize fully EGs. However, the downside of the RTAs approach is that trade 
may be diverted from countries that are most efficient at producing certain EGs but are 
excluded from the RTAs. Moreover, by entailing generally the zero rating of all products, 
                                                 
5 In a letter to President Barack Obama on August 3, 2009, the National Foreign Trade 
Council and eight other U.S. business groups urged his administration to “use all possible 
channels” to pursue an agreement on reducing barriers to trade in EGS, even if that 
means going outside the Doha Round (Palmer, 2009). 
6 It would make more climate sense to define critical mass as a share of emissions rather 
as a share of trade. After all, any agreement on climate-friendly goods aims to cut GHG 
emissions by providing more choices of low costs. However, this approach depends on 
how such climate-friendly goods are produced and what goods they are going to replace. 
Thus, it is much more difficult to calculate emissions than to calculate trade 
value/volume. Moreover, such an effort is well beyond the familiar for the WTO. Taken 
together, while the approach sounds very appealing theoretically, these complications 
would make it hard to implement in practice.  
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the RTAs approach removes any tariff differential between EGs and their non preferable 
like products. Whether such an elimination of tariffs in EGs would be enough to 
encourage their larger utilization in a competitive environment with other non-EGs 
depends on their relative prices and the stringency of environmental policy in home 
countries. Even if the prices of energy-efficient EGs are higher than that of their non 
preferable like products, that would not necessarily put these EGs at a disadvantage 
position. Provided energy subsidies are removed and prices are attached to emission 
reduction, any higher initial costs of energy-efficient EGs may well be compensated by 
cost-saving through energy-saving over their lifetimes. The demonstration of new EGs 
(technologies) that a country has not yet familiar with but have a high replicability 
potential plays a role in this context as well, because that is the first but crucial step in 
showing how effective these new EGs are in cutting pollution and supporting its spin-off 
to the rest of the economy. 
 
This paper focuses on liberalizing climate-friendly goods and technologies in terms of the 
reduction or elimination of tariffs. Undoubtedly, the results of such a tariff reduction or 
elimination would be positive, but it would not be significant for increased uptakes of 
these goods and technologies in developing countries. Many African countries already 
have very low tariffs on many environmental goods, but have little imports because of a 
lack of purchasing power and technical assistance. Also, as tariffs in developed countries 
are already very low, - generally less than 3% for EGs on the OECD list (Vikhlyaev, 
2003), and as not all EGs are sensitive to reduction in tariffs,7 the market access of 
developing countries to developed country markets thus depends more on reduction or 
removal of trade restrictions in terms of NTBs, such as, technical standards and 
certification requirement, labeling requirements, and tied-aid that grants a tariff 
preference for donor country’s goods and services, as well as tax and subsidy measures, 
which are considered significant impediments to developing countries’ access to 
developed country markets. Developing countries constantly refer to intellectual property 
rights as a barrier to access much-needed and advanced low-carbon technologies as well 
because of their high licensing fees or royalty payments. All this suggests that high tariffs 
are only one of the factors that determine access to and affordability of climate-friendly 
goods and technologies, and thus that action beyond tariff reduction or elimination is 
needed.  
 
To serve the best interests of developing countries, other efforts than an exclusive focus 
on tariff reduction or elimination need to be considered to enable developing countries to 
access both climate-friendly goods and technologies at an affordable price and developed 
country markets. Special and different treatment provisions will also be essential to fully 
recognizing the concerns of developing countries. They include less than full reciprocity, 
flexibility in terms of longer implementation periods, or both for developing countries, or 
optional participation for least developed countries. A package of technical and finance 
assistance is badly needed as well to ensure that all developing countries are able to 
benefit from the rapidly growing world market for climate-friendly goods and 
                                                 
7 An analysis of 84 energy supply products in the Friends’ 153 EGs list by Jha (2008) 
reveals that only 30% of these products are sensitive to a tariff reduction. 
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technologies. At least one WTO industrialized country member – Canada – in its 
submission has recognized the importance of such an assistance and has pledged to 
provide it. In my view, all these aforementioned initiatives could be made part of the EGs 
package for it to work. Moreover, EGS talks need boost from other areas. Effective 
technology transfer and financial mechanisms are widely believed to have played the 
decisive role in making the MP to work effectively (Zhang, 2009a). Given that the scope 
of economic activities affected by a climate regime is several orders of magnitude larger 
than those covered by the MP, technology transfer and deployment, financing and 
capacity building are considered as the even more essential components of any post-2012 
climate change agreement that developing countries would agree upon to succeed the 
Kyoto Protocol. If and when such a post-2012 climate change deal were reached, that 
would significantly enhance possibilities for a breakthrough of reaching an EGS deal 
under the WTO. 
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